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East of Vienna, South of the Drina: Explaining the Constituencies for Europe in Southeastern Europe

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Introduction

The links between Southeastern Europe and Western Europe have always been ambiguous. The old border on the River Drina between the Western Roman Empire and the Eastern one was somehow kept alive throughout history; the later frontier between the Ottoman and the Habsburg empires fell about there as well; today, the lucky part of former Yugoslavia that is fully accepted by Europe lies north of Drina while to the South the periphery starts. Samuel Huntington (1991) placed there the dividing line between the European civilization and the rest, that is, between Western Christian denomination and the Balkan Orthodox and Muslim. Greek guides may well claim to tourists that Europe's birthplace falls on their island; Balkan inhabitants have always known that Europe starts only west of Vienna. Indeed in old times, travelers from the region going north and west in Europe knew that their journey led "inside."

However, peripheral Southeastern Europe does have a specific European identity, drawing on a twofold tradition: as the heir of the Byzantine Orthodox Church, a tradition it shares to some extent with Russia, and as a postcommunist region, a more recent heritage it shares with Central East Europe.

This chapter discusses the roots of the Balkans' attraction to Europe with a focus on Romania and Bulgaria, the most advanced EU accession countries, drawing on both distant and recent history, comparing them with the rest of the Balkans as well as to Central Europe. The data used for public opinion models comes from a regional survey in Southeastern Europe organized by the Fifth Framework EU program and from the well-known World Values Survey. The latest Eurobarometer data are also quoted.

The Balkans from Periphery of Europe to EU Accession

Regions are often conventional constructs, made to fit scholars or diplomats' needs. According to different criteria, one can build different sets of regions. If we judge by the clusters of public opinion observed by Ronald Inglehart, the postcommunist world—European or non-European—makes roughly just one region (Inglehart 1997). But according to its treatment by the European Union, postcommunist Europe divides into three. The first group is made of the eight new EU members; the second group is made of Russia and most of the successor states of the Soviet Union, whose future is seen as clearly distinct from Europe; and the third group consists of countries that for various reasons missed the first group but cannot, due to their geographical location, belong to the second. This is the gray zone known as "the Balkans" or Southeastern Europe. In 1945, this region included only five countries: Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece (sometimes Turkey was added), with a fair mixture of denominations: Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim with few protestants. Nowadays, there are 10—the additional being Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia, whereas Montenegro and Kosovo are waiting in the wings.

But many dispute their placement in the Balkans. Romania has long claimed to be misplaced as the Balkan Mountains are not even close to its territory and its language is Latin-based. Croatia and Slovenia have also done their best to escape the mark of the region by emphasizing their Habsburg past and their Catholicism. Greece only sees something positive to the label "Balkan," and Bulgaria endures it with stoicism (her national air carrier, Balkan Air, went bankrupt in recent years). In studies of nineteenth- and twentieth-century nationalism and nation-building, the custom has indeed spread to use the term "Balkan" as a negative, albeit poorly defined, attribute, in relation to ethnic diversity, mass violence, and intricate wars. The legitimacy of such definitions has recently

come under attack as they clearly reflected less geographical or socioe-conomic realities and more cultural stereotypes (Todorova 1997; Wolff 1994), but they are still prevailing in journalism and best-selling travel books.

What remains uncertain is whether, East to Trieste or South to the Dniestr, there was ever, or still is, a community of some coherence. As Stevan K. Pavlowitch put it, are the Balkans more than just "a unity imposed by history" (Pavlowitch 1999)? With Slovenia already in the European Union, Romania negotiating—alongside Bulgaria—to join in 2007 and Croatia preparing to start negotiations for its own entry, the region is shrinking fast.

There is, however, a common historical background to Southeastern Europe that is strong enough to justify the ranging of Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania alongside the rest of the Balkans. This part of postcom-munist Europe has been under Ottoman domination. It not only shares a common culture, being mostly Christian Orthodox, but it has also experienced Ottoman religious autonomy and the peaceful existence of numerous denominations. They have shared the common experience of mismatch between ethnicity and statehood. These countries were also considerably poorer than Central European countries and remain so. The percentage of the population depending on agriculture was his-torically another element of likeness. The World Bank classifies them presently as "lower-middle-income economies," together with Maghreb countries, Central America, China, Russia, and Turkey—but not Central Europe. That means a 2001 GNI per capita[1] at $1,710 USD for Romania and $1,560 for Bulgaria, compared to Slovakia's $3,700, Russian Federation's $1,760, and Yugoslavia's—what is left of it—$940.

In short, countries of the region belong to the same cluster of rural underdeveloped societies. Politically, in modern times they were all monarchies, more or less constitutional, endowed with dynasties of Western origin as yet another sign of Western interventionism (other-wise they would not have even been granted independent statehood at the Berlin Congress in 1878). And their Ottoman and Byzantine lega-cies are undoubtedly common. The Ottoman Empire not only granted religious autonomy to the Balkan peoples, but it also adopted many of the Byzantine political practices making them its own. This meant that Balkan societies were left behind on two accounts. On the one hand, they followed passively the Ottomans in their stagnation and decline, being both politically and economically subordinated; on the other hand, their church remained suspended to the late Byzantine Empire.

The legacies with a lasting impact for the present Balkans include a pattern of small rural holdings, weak cities and scarce elites on the social side, unchallenged power of the autocratic state over society and church on the political side, and on top of this the successful manipulation of demography in order to preserve ethnic heterogeneity and rivalry. The Ottoman demographic intervention, consisting in displacements of whole populations and playing one group against another prevented that process of ethnic homogenization that took place in most of Western Europe.

This history strongly grounded in the geopolitics of Southeastern Europe influenced in brutal and subtle ways the current path of Balkan peoples. Therefore, the temptation becomes when explaining individual countries' performance in the region to settle for the *bon mot* of Emil Cioran: "Nous sommes mal placés!" ("We are badly placed") and stress their placement as the key explanation. And indeed local elites indulge frequently in blaming geopolitics for the present state of their societies. Historical facts, such as the resistance of local princes to the Ottoman advance in Europe are turned into full explanatory and justifying myths: the Balkans are backward when compared with Western Europe because they defended Western Europe at the cost of their own Europeanness. Only exceptionally is the opposite argument found, that the Byzantine tradition is *not* European, and its legacy of autocracy and synthesis of powers in the person of the monarch is completely different from the Western story of competition among various powers (Iorga 1929; Todorova 1996).

The perceived pattern of "abandonment by the West" continued after a few decades of independence in the first half of the twentieth century. Regional geopolitics were played out again, more strongly for Romania and Bulgaria, which unlike Yugoslavia or Albania, turned communist solely due to Soviet occupation. From the *antemuralis Christianitatis* to the "betrayal" of Yalta, which still haunts public opinion in Belgrade, Sofia, and Bucharest, the story of Southeastern Europe as told by its inhabitants is one of nostalgia for the brief time when the Balkans were nearly European—between the two world wars—and of longing for a return that they fear will take many years and may never happen. The "return to Europe" of the Central European first group of eight countries, accomplished by 2004, was itself fought over until the last moment and owes quite a debt to the tragic fate of postcommunist Yugoslavia. For a region so predisposed to recognize only gloom and doom as the Balkans, the happy end is far from being already scripted and many ambiguities remain to this day associated to their European status.

However, recent history seems kinder to the Balkans. The invitation of Romania and Bulgaria in 1999 to join the European Union by 2007, extended to Croatia in 2004 and the negotiation and concluding of a range of Stability and Association Pacts (SAP) with countries of the Western Balkans suggests that geographical gloom and doom may be left behind. It may still take some years, but they are literally at the doorstep of Europe, having achieved a status quite unimaginable five years ago. The EU perspective is emerging as "the *Archimedean point* of the entire process of stabilisation and development" for the battered Balkans, providing both the peoples in the region and the international community with a real prospect for a breakthrough that would lead the region away from the divisions and the conflicts of the past and toward Europe (Van Meurs and Yannis 2002). The attraction of Europe is as strong as in the Southeast as in Central Europe and the words of Adam Michnik equally apply to the postcommunist Balkans:

> For us, Europeans from behind the Iron Curtain, the idea of Europe was simply a rejection of the Communist project. It symbolized freedom instead of servitude, creativity instead of obedience and fear, colorfulness and pluralism instead of greyness and uniformity, human rights instead of the principle that people are property of the state, open borders and legality instead of barbed wire, the Berlin Wall, and preventive censorship. (Michnik 2001)

As in Central Europe, the first vote against communist parties in free elections signified also and mostly "a return to Europe." The prospect of joining the European Union has, from the very beginning, been the engine of democratization and transformation that has taken place in the region. A "Return to Europe" was what citizens voted for in the first free elections (O'Connor and Kearns 2002). After the fall of Slobodan Milosevic, no significant political leader in the region now dares to be openly anti-European. Former nationalists converted overnight under the pressure of popular enthusiasm for European accession and lure of European funds. Though millions of Balkan inhabitants cross daily the Western border legally or illegally to work in the European Union, technocrats, experts, and selected politicians in Western as well as Southeastern Europe struggle to bring Europe to the battered Balkans. There is no alternative project, neither on the table nor in the social imagination.

A return to Europe, but to what kind of Europe? Ordinary people have some grasp of the current EU due to inexpensive cable TV and

the temporary labor migration that exploded in Romania and Bulgaria in recent years. And the European parliament socializes politicians via exchange programs. But intellectuals are the ones left behind. They are slow to understand that Europe is now the EU. In fact they accept the idea only in part, as it was not the Europe they dreamed of "returning to" during the communist years. Michnik spoke on behalf of intellectuals in the whole region when asking, "Is the new, united Europe born from the spirit of philosophy or the spirit of economics? From Aristotle and Plato, or Schroeder (or better Kohl) and Van den Broek? If the new Europe is to be uniquely the product of economy and Brussels' bureaucracy, will its labyrinths created at the beginning of the new century put into practice Kafka's labyrinths from the beginnings of the last century?" (Van Meurs and Yannis, 2002). What gave the EU its strong initial attraction, the identification with Europe, was later revealed as an important source of misunderstanding and reciprocal disillusionment (Rupnik 2003).

The French-speaking elitist Europe that N. Titulescu, G. Seferis, or Ivo Andric so successfully made their own between the two world wars is gone. It subsists only in the memory of Southeast Europeans. A tour from Tirana to Bucharest to meet editors of cultural magazines and research institutes can still be done by speaking French only. But contemporary Europe is less attractive for intellectuals. Although struggling to demonstrate that Aristotle was himself Balkan, in order to turn shame into fame, Balkan intellectuals know little of the present European project and the little they know, they mostly do not like. Too much talk of market and institutions and too little of spiritual affairs, they deem. Paris has persisted as *the* cultural capital in both Sofia and Bucharest, despite the investment of the Wissenschaft Kolleg from Berlin in local advanced studies institutes. Vienna, London, and Berlin come second to Paris, while the youngest and the most pragmatic skip Europe altogether by crossing the ocean. Though ordinary Bulgarians and Romanians have learned the ways of Schengen work permits and three months visa-free stays, cultural life in both Sofia and Bucharest seems at times to be placed in the European cultural 1960s and 1970s, if not earlier. The return to Europe means the freedom to translate from Jung or Spengler, from Lacan and Heidegger, not from the obscure Robert Schuman or Jean Monnet.

Political elites have quite a different stance. Though fully unaware of cultural affairs and truly committed to Europe as a development dream, most of them remain fairly ignorant in European affairs. A television report excoriated Romanian MPs after the European Commission's

highly publicized Progress Report on Romania and Bulgaria in 2003 revealed how few of them were able to name the organization that produced such reports or even place it in Brussels. Party position papers on European accession produced by individual parties in Romania and Bulgaria remain the exception rather than the norm. The discourse on Europe remains fairly general and nonspecific. The few technocrats who have some knowledge about Europe are all involved in negotiations on both sides, either the domestic government or the local EU delegations that represent the European Commission. Most of the local expertise, which is both quantitatively and qualitatively limited, is mobilized by EU-funded agencies like the European Institutes. The purpose of such agencies is to inform policy by producing impact accession studies, but actually the few good studies that are occasionally produced originate from independent think-tanks. By and large, enlargement for Romania and Bulgaria progresses similarly to the whole postcommunist wave, based more on the experience of previous accessions rather than the in-depth assessment of what EU integration would actually mean for these countries and economies. The stage of the negotiations is very present in the media and the overwhelming majority of the mainstream and tabloid press is in favor of EU integration.

Hypothesis on the Drive toward Europe

Where does attraction to Europe come from? There are quite a few distinct theoretical traditions explaining the drive to unify the European continent. The answer differs considerably when publics, cultural, or political elites are considered. Cultural elites seem attracted by the myth of a common European cultural identity; political elites see in Europe the ultimate safeguard of their national interests (Milward 1992), which, in the case of Eastern Europe, mostly refers to historical threats such as Russian expansion. However, as in the recent exceptional history of Eastern Europe, quite a few intellectuals became heads of state, the two drives merge to some point. In the words of an intellectual who become prime minister of Slovakia,

> Today, in our talk about the European Union we stress European directives, talk about regulations, prepare a far-reaching institutional reform. But if our project is to be strong, it would have to rely on something different than just these aspects, however

important they are. European Union of the future is not a matter
of regulations, it is a matter of our creativity. Europe will still be
defined by its vision.[2]

As for the publics, they seem more divided than elites on the issue.
However, East European publics are considerably less divided than West
European ones. Despite the doubts shed by the low turnout in the 2004
European elections in new member-states, the wave of proaccession
referenda in the region, as well as the regular polls show that the spirit
of "return to Europe" still prevails. Romania and Bulgaria, as well as
Turkey, top the hierarchies of confidence in Europe, the desire to join
Europe, and the belief that Europe is good for them (see table A12 in
the Internet appendix).[3] In 2003, as trust in the European Union
regressed slightly in the new entrant countries (-2), in Bulgaria and
Romania it increased again (with 6 and 7, respectively). The two coun-
tries are already above the average at both confidence in EU and sup-
port for EU integration.

Explanations of the public support for EU originate in studies of
West European publics (see Rohrschneider and Whitefield, introduc-
tion to this volume). When discussing East European publics, the pre-
liminary question to be addressed prior to the country by country
analysis is to what extent there are the same general factors driving EU
support in the East compared with the West. The trauma of Western
Europe by the time unification was conceived by the founding fathers
was continental war due to conflicts between France and Germany. The
trauma of Eastern Europe in the same period and up until present times
is to have its borders and regime decided by outsiders, conspicuously by
Russia. Western Europe enriched gradually and developed a "social"
model of the market economy as it went along with unification; Eastern
Europe was subjected to savage redistribution, destruction of property
rights and the class of owners until regaining its freedom in 1989. In
other words, there are good reasons to look for differences in why East
and West Europeans endorse Europe, as well as in their expectations of
it; the general attraction of Europe is likely to be grounded in the spe-
cific and quite different recent *histories* of the East and West. Beyond this
historical and geographical specificity, one can reasonably expect that
some factors that cause an individual to be in favor of Europe play sim-
ilarly in the two halves of the continent.

A review of the literature allows the synthesis of a few broad cate-
gories of determinants of an individual's attitude toward Europe. They
can then be operationalized into variables to be tested in a model.

For the East European public, the Balkans included, a survey of these probable causes of pro-European attitudes returns the following determinants.

Recent Historical Trauma and Need for Security

The aftermath of World War II led to an unprecedented domination of the region by the Soviet Union, which led to the installation of communist regimes. The only exception was Greece. Central European countries, as well as Bulgaria and Romania, were forced into the Warsaw Pact and were coerced through the cold war to be in the camp of their oppressor, the Soviet Union, and against the free West. As Michnik and the other dissidents often observed, it was this forced allegiance to the anti-Western camp that instilled in the broader publics of the region the desire to belong to the West, with which Europe was equated. A special survey in the Balkans on this topic finds this reality to have endured thus far (Krastev 2004).

From this perspective, integration with Europe would then simply be the last chapter of the East European anticommunist revolution, as the "return" to Europe has been its first symbolic page. By joining the European Union, the only political club offered to them, East Europeans seek to fulfill the same ideal as with joining NATO: becoming a part of the West forever, secure and untouchable by any new geopolitical hazards of the East. This means that we should find a powerful association between variables measuring anticommunism (such as center–right or right-wing ideology) and, more generally, pro-Western support and the pro-European attitudes. This reason, so primed by thinkers of the region, before and after the "split" into a new and an old Europe during the Iraqi crisis, should be no trivial explanation, but the key determinant of the drive to join European Union. Its paradox consists in its mixed character, both idealistic and instrumental. The "ideology" hypothesis was also tested in the West in a different context (interpreted as class partisanship) and Inglehart, Rabier, and Reif discovered Eurobarometer evidence that left partisans support European integration less than right partisans (Inglehart, Rabier, and Reif 1997). This is what we would expect in Eastern Europe, as anticommunists are also the most prodemocratic and pro-Western in all the regional surveys. As to the general security hypothesis, we would simply expect the same people who are in favor of the EU to be also in favor of the United States, or any Western (so more than just European) club, such as NATO.

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Figures for the Balkans show a marked difference between Romania and Bulgaria, on one side, with a pattern perfectly similar to Central Europe and former Yugoslavia (see figure 8.1). The former display a great correlation between support for EU and support for NATO, and support is high. In former Yugoslavia, we find somewhat more support for the EU than for NATO, identified with bombing Serbia and Montenegro, and siding with Albanians in the resolution of the Macedonian crisis. However, the two remain firmly correlated, supporting the idea that "West" and "Europe" are barely distinguishable concepts for the great public.

Personal Expected Benefit

That the drive toward Europe is primarily motivated by economic expectations has long been hypothesized as the so-called utilitarianism hypothesis (Anderson 1998; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Inglehart 1970). It argues that citizens of integrated Europe support the integration project to the extent that they benefit from it, as benefits are quite different for various social categories. It predicted, therefore, that support for Europe is associated with higher education and more sophisticated occupational skills. Europe is also


Figure 8.1   NATO and EU confidence compared (in percentage).

presented in the media as economically advantageous, with an economy stronger and more competitive than national ones. Most models include more than just one variable measuring this factor, from individual skills to evaluations of national economy, household economy, and perceived economic threats. Reviewing the evidence in 2000, again for West European publics, Gabel found the most substantial support for utilitarianism against every other hypothesis (Gabel 1998b).

In an Eastern context, a lot can be said on behalf of this hypothesis. Part of the attraction of the West, visible mostly in the divided Berlin during the cold war, was clearly material. The so-called demonstration effect that led to the desertion of communism even by its most staunch supporters refers to this materialist component: as the joke went during communism, a person on welfare in West Germany was making more money than the richest worker of Eastern Europe. The European funds for agriculture and regional development were fought over fiercely during negotiations, especially by Poles, and thus became intensely publicized in all accession countries. Other EU benefits, such as the freedom to travel or work in the European Union for East Europeans, who make in their own countries below a third of the income of West Europeans are fairly obvious. More than the hard-to-grasp benefits of belonging or not to Euroland, East Europeans have simpler, clearer EU benefits to expect. And indeed Romania, Turkey, and Bulgaria have the highest economic expectations from the accession countries and the new members, excepting Hungary (European Commission 2003; Gral-Iteo 2002).

When it comes to operationalizing these variables, we encounter some problems. Education, at the individual level, may be indirect proof that an individual expects doing better in united Europe, but it is direct proof that somebody has better knowledge of Europe, a necessary precondition of trust in general (mentioned in the literature as the "cognitive mobilization" hypothesis) (Inglehart 1990). We would then expect EU supporters and confidants to be better educated on both accounts, and it is rather difficult to distinguish among them. On a similar line, we expect individuals who are better traveled to Europe to be more in favor of EU, but how can we tell if this occurs due to their superior knowledge of Europe or to their superior networking in Europe, which may lead to expect personal advantages (such as finding a temporary or permanent job) over those who are not networked? Personal satisfaction with household economy remains a clear indicator, but in an East European context, there is still less income differentiation, even so many years after communism, compared to Western

Europe. We reasonably expect urbanites, regardless of whether they are blue-collar or white-collar laborers, having transferable skills, to fare better in united Europe than peasants, so we should find more support for Europe in urban areas. East Europeans are attracted by Western values and by Western security at the same time, and they judge the latter to be the consequence of the former. The sacrifice endured during transition in order to mold these societies after the Western model—the European one in the second half of the transition—shows the same mixture of realism and idealism. Some differentiation can perhaps be made on the basis of Inglehart's work, which found in studies on the Western publics that the drive toward Europe is fed by postmaterialism (Inglehart 1990). Here again we find important differences between West and East, as the majority of East Europeans, in fact of all postcommunist citizens, are strongly materialistic according to World Values Survey. The macroeconomic reform consisted of inflation stabilization and generation of growth, precisely the items used to measure materialism, presented as key objectives of reform.

National Identity and Nationalism

Nationalism and national identity are often quoted as being in opposition to the drive toward reunification of Europe. While there is some evidence at the national level, such as right-wing nationalistic parties being as a rule Euroskeptic, at the individual level, the evidence is mixed at best. Social psychologists (Klandermans, Sabucedo, and Rodriguez 2003; Licata and Klein 2002; Triandafyllidou 1998) have come up with evidence showing that a European identity is not certain to reduce anti-immigrant prejudice: some results point actually to the contrary. Nationalism is seldom studied at the individual level; generalizations from an individual to a group, and from a small group to society are the source of many errors and biases. Among other things, they generated the so-called paradox of "contact theory" (Forbes 1997). As phrased initially by Allport, contact theory claims that contact reduces prejudice among groups (Allport 1954). Decades of amassed evidence show that *individuals* who enjoy more contact with individuals from another ethnic group tend to be less prejudiced, but that *groups* with more contact with other groups tend to perceive more an ethnic conflict and to display prejudiced behavior. Generalizing from Allport's individual psychological approach to larger groups proved catastrophic, as is the case with many other variables that do not account for individuals but do

matter for group behavior, groups are more than sums of individuals and societies are not constituted by the number of social groups within them.

In this context, it is very important to distinguish between national identities at the individual level, which many studies found to coexist perfectly with European individual identities (Van Kersbergen 2000), and nationalism. The relation between the two is weak or nonexistent (Mungiu-Pippidi 2004). National identity is only the national self-ascription of an individual, whereas nationalism is the *individual subscription to the political ideology advocating the perfect congruity of the political unit with the national (ethnic) unit* (Barry 1987) and is therefore inseparable of a certain "exclusionary flavor" (Sidanius and Pratto 2000). Patriotism itself, attachment to the nation, is not necessarily nationalistic, as patriots, unlike nationalists, might well conceive the nation as a political, not ethnic, community. Social identity theory is sometimes invoked in the context of European identity (Hooghe and Marks 2004; Triandafyllidou 2002). Social identity theory postulates that "identity" arises through social comparison, and that we tend to discriminate other groups in favor of our own, as the main drive of groups is to be high on self-esteem (Brewer 1997; Tajfel 1981).

On the basis of this theory we would expect Europeans to start developing a common identity only as opposed to, for example, Americans, but we would not expect any tension between national and European identity, on two grounds: first, because from the national standpoint, there are no "Europeans" to compare with; second, because the European identity is endowed with high social esteem, so it is reasonable for individuals to "add" this new and valuable identity to their "old" national or ethnic ones. We would, on the contrary, expect *nationalism* to be in some tension with European integration. EU poses a challenge to national sovereignty, as it transfers some of it to European institutions and governing bodies. The national territory is no longer the locus of the exclusive and absolute national sovereignty. Moreover, national laws and the decisions of the national government have to be consistent with European rulings (Triandafyllidou 2002, 42). If this is right, then we should find evidence of a relationship between nationalism and Euroskepticism, but we should *not* find a negative association between support for Europe and patriotism or national identification.

The situation of the Balkans is indeed worth checking in this respect. Western Europe was terrified by the resurgence of nationalism after communism in Eastern Europe, and the Balkans, due to their proximity

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to the core of Europe, are seen as the most nationalistic. However, as table 8.1 shows, the Balkans is rather on the average of postcommunist Europe when it comes to nationalistic *attitudes*. Nevertheless, the same attitudes that do not matter in Hungary, practically an ethnically homogenous country, might strongly matter in the Balkans due to the poor match between state and ethnicity that makes their most important Ottoman legacy.

Governance and Elite Intermediation

In a Western context, the factors relevant for this category tested are increased media consumption and government support, as the support to Europe seems mediated by the country leaders (Franklin, Van der Eijk, and Marsh 1995) and by the media. Party cues and the national political system were also discussed in this context, as in Rohrschneider's democratic performance model (Rohrschneider 2002). Again the situation of the East requires some qualifications here. While they are democrats, East Europeans are extremely critical toward their national political systems. Trust in political parties and parliaments is lower in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe, majorities across postcommunist Europe would prefer experts to political governments and the public perceives political elites as a privileged and unaccount-able class. Indeed most instruments of accountability that function in consolidated democracies are only at their beginnings in postcommunist Europe. At the important question of preference of national democracy over Brussels democracy, East Europeans are on average in favor of

Table 8.1   Nationalism as a Broad Regional Phenomenon

Country	Territorial nationalism (% agree)	Minorities a threat (% agree)
Romania	76	44
Bulgaria	67	43
Kosovo	81	78
Serbia	50	75
Slovakia	—	72
Montenegro	22	35
Macedonia	71	85
Hungary	60	—

Sources: Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Montenegro 2003 (Gallup IBEU Project) Slovakia 2000, Serbia 2002 (Freedom House); Kosovo 2002 (UNDP); Hungary 1995 (MODUS).

Brussels, exactly the opposite of Western Europeans (see figure A4 in
the Internet appendix). Romania and Bulgaria, alongside Poland and
Slovakia, top the list. The unaccountable and bureaucratic Brussels as
seen from the West is perceived as a technocratic paradise from the East.
Especially in the Balkans, survey data shows that publics are unhappy
with the persistence of particularism, notably in relation with the civil
service and the administration, and the improper functioning of the
rule of law. Majorities deny that citizens are indeed equal in front of the
law, and complain of corruption of the political elites, according to the
IBEU survey data. By contrast, Western Europe is seen as a society based
on fairness and the principle of universalism.

This is an important category. The rather uncritical stance of East
Europeans toward Brussels may explain, among others, their very low
turnout in the first round of European elections, as their vote in favor
of EU in the referenda meant entrusting some of their government to
be managed by Westerners, not their own MPs recycled as European
MPs. It may also explain why governments that fared well in the process
of EU integration lost without exception the elections in new member
countries. The publics support their governments on the EU, but as this
is a nonspecific policy, shared across political spectrum as the "mission"
of the whole political class, success on EU means little compared to
perceived accountability and fairness.

More Distant Historical Factors

Traditional Western Europe has always been richer than the East, and
either Catholic or Protestant. Although these factors were less invoked
in conjunction with EU integration than in connection with democ-
racy and development, EU integration can succeed only in democratic
and developed countries. Moreover, after Samuel Huntington invoked
the border with the Orthodox denomination to the East and Southeast
as the border of the European civilization, considerable paranoia flour-
ished in the Balkans, dissipated only in part by the invitations to join
given to Bulgaria and Romania in 1999.

However, it is difficult to see how these historical factors can play out
today. The poorest immigrants who come to Europe, for instance the
Albanians (also from an extremely pro-European country) show that
one needs no development to discern that one's self-interest is better
served by Europe than by a poor original country. Romanians and
Bulgarians are overwhelmingly Orthodox, but they are in the lead in

favorable attitudes toward the EU. However, a test of the older histori-
cal legacies, such as Orthodox denomination or development is worth
considering.

Explaining Confidence in Europe

I will now proceed in two steps, using two different databases. First, I
want to test Romania and Bulgaria comparatively with Central
European countries, their former Warsaw Pact fellows. The last 50 years
of history were quite similar in these countries, and despite different
transition modes, their subsequent reform trajectories have also been
comparable. The comparison excludes, therefore, former Yugoslav and
former Soviet Union countries, which enjoy different historical back-
grounds, and includes Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia
on one side (the formal Central Europe alliance known as "Vishegrad
countries") and Romania and Bulgaria, two Orthodox, and Balkan
countries on the other side. Pooling together all Warsaw Pact East
European countries also allows us to test whether the general factors
explaining pro-European attitudes in the East are similar to the Western
models reported in literature. In another version, the data for Croatia
and Slovenia was also pooled, allowing comparison of four Balkan
countries against four Central European ones. These analyses are based
on World Values Survey 1998.[4]

In the second step I moved the analytical framework to the Balkans,
using the very recent (2003) data of the IBEU Fifth Framework survey
in Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. This panel
of countries allows a comparison between Eastern Balkans and Western
Balkans. The same data are used to build national separate models for
Romania and Bulgaria. More than explaining the maximum variance
for each sample (Romanian, Bulgaria, and pooled), I tried to test exactly
the same predictors in order to allow a fair comparison across countries
and the region.

The dependent variable I used for all the models was not support for
EU integration, as countries are in different stages of integration or—
as in the case of Serbia—they have not yet started at all the process. In
the case of Romania and Bulgaria, support for integration is in any case
so high that the tiny minority against joining left is mostly made of
people who are not aware of the existence of the EU and the prospects
of joining. East Europeans are more specific, however, when it comes to
the evaluation of the EU in general, regardless of whether they are in

favor of joining or not. For these reasons, I use as the dependent variable how much confidence people feel in the European Union. Not only in former Yugoslavia are people quite critical of the EU on this measure, but also in Warsaw Pact countries there is more variation when measuring confidence in the EU, where some criticism or scepticism is displayed than when measuring support for EU, perceived as a historical fatality and therefore endorsed by large majorities. The two variables of confidence in European Union varied slightly in wording, the World Values Study question asking simply whether people trust EU, whereas the IBEU questions asking more explicitly, "Do you trust EU to want the best for your country?"

Former Yugoslavia differs sharply here from Central Europe. In the last decade, the EU failed to prevent and contain in a timely way the Yugoslav wars, brokered peace arrangements that left many frustrated, and was on the side of NATO when bridges and other buildings used mostly by civilians were bombed in Serbia and Montenegro. While the EU has developed relations recently by sending EU troops to Macedonia, and initiating the Stability and Accession process for former Yugoslavia, unlike the smooth partnership with Romania and Bulgaria, there remain mixed feelings in Western Balkans. In Serbia, less than a third believes Europe wants what is best for them; in Montenegro the figure falls to less than a fifth (see figure A5 in the Internet appendix). While Eurobarometer data show that a referendum on accession would pass in any of these countries if organized today, the current policy of EU toward them is viewed with moderate enthusiasm. The Western Balkans still face a long transition. Bulgaria felt its exclusion from the first wave of enlargement as unjust. Only Romanians feel that they are treated about right. So the first conclusion is that the specific relationship between a country and Europe, the treatment Europe reserves for a country, is of great importance when creating a constituency for Europe.

Table A13 in the Internet appendix shows the results of an analysis of the various determinants of EU support discussed above. Prior to discussing determinants by categories and across countries, the model considers effects across the Warsaw Pact countries as a whole and confirms the specificities of Eastern Europe, while supporting some findings from the Western European publics research. Dislike for the former communist regime and endorsement of a government by experts, together with an array of other antipolitics feelings not included in the final model (available from the author) indicate that integration is viewed as the final act of the 1989 revolution. Comparison of the

Orthodox with the rest of respondents shows that *there is no significant difference between them and the Western denominations* when it comes to Europe. Also, no significant difference was found among the four Balkan countries in the larger pooled sample and the Vishegrad countries. So it is the recent, not the distant, history that explains the European constituencies of Eastern Europe.

The Romanian and Bulgarian models (see table A14 in the Internet appendix) endorse even more the idea that Euroenthusiasm in the East is a different animal than in the West. The one predictor overwhelming all others and accounting for most of the explained variance, well above the usual level at such numbers, is trust for NATO (see also chapter 10 by Loveless and Rohrschneider on this issue). Trust for EU and trust for NATO in Romania and Bulgaria are so deeply linked that it is clear that respondents consider them two parts of the same whole, the West. The idea of a disagreement between NATO and EU is inconceivable in Eastern Europe, where accession to the two bodies was also presented as one process in two complementary parts, security first and development after. East Europeans value NATO for its security guarantee and its symbolic winning of the cold war as much as they value EU. Their elites share these feelings, and it is important to mention to what extent these are widespread grassroots attachments. The EU and NATO are part of the same emotional and cognitive edifice, the West, built in decades of frustrations. Weakening of any of the parts might alter the whole.

A review of the factors' performance in the seven models presented in tables A13 and A14 allows a general picture of the European constituents.

Security and Historical Trauma

This factor emerges as very powerful. Trust for NATO in the Balkan sample and rejection of the former communist regime in the Warsaw Pact countries sample show that the confidence in Europe among people in accession countries has deep historical roots. Europe means more for these people than just the Europe of treaties and regulations. Belonging to Europe is belonging to the West, an ideal people dreamed of during the decades of communism. This makes, of course, the main difference between Eastern and Western pro-Europe constituencies. Western countries joined the EU sensibly and rationally, and their publics are eternally divided over calculations of costs versus benefits,

whereas Eastern ones "returned to Europe" as the last stage of a revo-
lution. There is also a strong link between being on the right and being
in favor of Europe, as we expected. The most committed Europeans are
the anticommunists.

Personal Expected Benefits

People who are active, young and middle aged, reside in urban areas,
and are more educated emerge in most models as more pro-European.
The relation between household economic situation and support for
Europe is confirmed in the Warsaw Pact sample only. People who travel
more frequently trust Europe more in the Bulgarian sample, a robust
predictor in all variants of the model, but which is not replicated in the
Romanian sample. The explanatory value of these predictors is small,
except for Bulgaria.

Governance and Elite Intermediation

There is important confirmation of the hypothesis that perception of
poor national governance feeds trust in the EU. Preference to expert
governments is a robust predictor in the Warsaw Pact sample, and vari-
ous items of distrust in politicians and discontent with the rule of law
surface in the Balkan sample. *People trust Europe to be less corrupted and
more competent in governing their societies than their own political elites and this
adds to the attraction of Europe.* However, there is also a correlation
between interest in politics and trust in Europe in the Warsaw Pact sam-
ple. For Romania and Bulgaria, the correlation is weak. In the
Romanian sample, there is also a correlation between trust in govern-
ment and trust in Europe, but it is not robust enough to hold in more
complex variants of the model.

Nationalism

Findings on nationalism endorse the results published by social psy-
chologists. National pride is not a significant determinant of trust in
Europe. Patriotism, using as proxy the willingness to fight for one's
country, is *positively* associated with confidence in Europe. In postcom-
munist Eastern Europe, they seem both to be indicators of a general

attitude of civic engagement. Nationalism, however, is negatively corre-
lated as we expected it to be. *People who have territorial claims on neigh-
boring countries and are paranoid toward ethnic minorities tend to have less
confidence in Europe*. This is a robust finding, surfacing in Romania,
Bulgaria, and the Balkan sample. (Clear-cut questions on nationalism
were not included in the World Values Survey, so this predictor is miss-
ing from the Warsaw Pact countries' sample.) Nationalist politicians can
find some lever against Europe in these attitudes, so it becomes all the
more important to convert the elites to the European project that will
render these borders and territorial claims less and less important.

Development and Other Historical Legacies

Romania and Bulgaria show more confidence in Europe than the rest
of the Balkans. Europe has been good to them in recent years, a per-
ception not yet shared by inhabitants of Macedonia or Montenegro. I
found no relation between regional development and European trust,
despite testing complex indexes of local development included in the
Balkan sample (aggregates of various infrastructure items in respon-
dent's town or village).

Conclusion

Despite the different speeds at which they are integrating with the
European Union, it seems that citizens of the Eastern Balkans are quite
similar to Central Europeans. Specific postcommunist features mark
strongly their confidence in the European Union and their grounds to
join Europe. They are likely to be enthusiastic Europeans, although not
very participative Europeans, at least for the generations that still
remember communism. As these memories fade, we may expect these
new European citizens to become more like Western Europeans, judg-
ing Europe by its performance, submitting it to what Ernest Renan
called "a daily plebiscite." The more Europe replaces the nation as the
political community, the more it will have to undertake this daily test.
It is likely that as time goes on, opinions on Europe might become
more differentiated than they are today and a more critical stance will
develop gradually.

It is unlikely that European integration will so dramatically change
these countries, that universalism will reign the day after accession or

even a decade after. The example of Greece shows that while Europe brings about development, it can be slow in changing culture. However, given that in the recent past Southeastern Europe had leaders like Ceausescu and Milosevic, the Greek example can and should be read as grounds for optimism. If all Balkan countries can copy the European path of Greece, the term "Balkans" itself will fade and become futile, and this part of Europe will lose the negative specificity that made its sad fame for so long.

Notes

1. Atlas method. GNI per capita is new term for GNP per capita.
2. Speech of the prime minister of Slovak Republic, Mikulas Dzurinda, at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the EPP-ED Group in Strasbourg, July 1, 2003.
3. The Internet appendix can be found at http: //www.indiana.edu/~iupolsci/ rrohrsch/ PalgraveTables+Figures.pdf
4. Courtesy of Hans-Dieter Klingemann.